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Introduction 
This paper charts the evolution of the theory of strategic culture through several generations of 
scholarship, both inside and outside the discipline, and explores contemporary arguments about 
the role of culture in shaping national security policy. Key questions include:  
· Do cultural theories provide useful explanations of national security policy?  
· Is strategic culture “semi-permanent,” as most of its supporters suggest, or can it evolve 
over time?  
· And how universal is strategic culture?  
The essay concludes that while constructivism has generated new attention to ideational 
foundations of national security policy behavior, there remains substantial room for refinement of 
the research program. 
Recent events have renewed scholarly interest in the role of culture in international security. 
Scholars and practitioners have begun to interpret challenges like the struggle to consolidate the 
Iraqi democracy, U.S.-China trade disputes, and the war on terror through the lens of national 
identity and culture. This essay charts the evolution of the theory of strategic culture through 
several generations of scholarly work inside and outside the discipline. Key questions include: 
What are the ideational foundations of national security policy? Do cultural theories, newly 
inspired by constructivism, provide the most accurate explanations of security policy? Is strategic 
culture really “semi-permanent,” as its supporters suggest, or can strategic culture evolve? Who 
are the ‘keepers’ of strategic culture? And how universal is strategic culture? I conclude that while 
contemporary works on strategic culture offer promise, there remains substantial room for 
development of more reflexive models. 
Political Culture  
The “national character studies” of the 1940s and 1950s represented some of the first social 
scientific efforts to draw connections between culture and state behavior based largely on 
anthropological models.[1] Early work defined the roots of a nation’s character, or culture, in 
language, religion, customs, socialization, and the interpretation of common memories.[2] While 
national character studies soon drew intense criticism, prominent sociologists and anthropologists 
including Mead, Douglas, and Levi-Strauss, continued to develop works linking culture and 
behavior.  
In one of the most influential anthropological works on the subject, The Interpretation of Cultures 
(1973), Geertz defined culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in 
symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.”[3] He 
provided a useful model of culture and suggested ways that patterns of meanings could lead to 
distinct behaviors.  
Political scientists Almond and Verba launched a high profile study of the concept of political 
culture in the 1960s, defining it as “that subset of beliefs and values of a society that relate to the 
political system.”[4] Political culture, they argued, included a commitment to values like 
democratic principles and institutions, ideas about morality and the use of force, the rights of 
individuals or collectivities, and predispositions toward the role of a country in global politics. 
Political culture manifests itself on at least three levels: “the cognitive, which includes empirical 
and causal beliefs; the evaluative, which consists of values, norms and moral judgments, and the 
expressive or affective, which encompasses emotional attachments, patterns of identity and 
loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference.”[5] Parsons added that culture was 
comprised of “interpretive codes” including language, values, and even substantive beliefs like 
support for democracy or the futility of war.[6] 
By the 1980s, interdisciplinary studies linking culture and politics had grown in popularity.[7] 
Sociologist Ann Swidler proposed a more complex model of connections between culture and 
state behavior, mediated by cultural “strategies of action.” Swidler defined culture quite broadly as 
consisting of “symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and 
ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of 
daily life.”[8] Building on the arguments of Weber and Parsons, she contended that interest-driven 
strategies are important, mediating conditions on state behavior.[9] 
But while sociological models of culture became increasingly complex, subsequent studies of 
political culture yielded little theoretical refinement during this period. Critics argued that the 
approach was epiphenomenal and subjective, and that proponents of political culture often made 
exaggerated claims about its explanatory power.[10] Cultural interpretive arguments fell out of 
favor with the behavioral revolution in the social sciences. The concept remained alive in area 
studies, but it garnered less attention in mainstream international relations scholarship. 
Strategic Culture and National Style  
The argument that culture could influence national security policy was grounded in classic works, 
including the writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu. Clausewitz advanced these ideas by 
recognizing war and war-fighting strategy as “a test of moral and physical forces.” The goal of 
strategy was much more than defeat of the enemy on the battlefield—it was the elimination of the 
enemy’s morale. Clausewitz stressed that leaders should not forget the real potential of a 
mobilized society, as he had witnessed first-hand in defeats by Napoleonic armies marching for 
the glory of the empire.[11] 
In 1977, Jack Snyder brought the political cultural argument into the realm of modern security 
studies by developing a theory of strategic culture to interpret Soviet military strategy. Snyder 
suggested that elites articulate a unique strategic culture related to security-military affairs that is 
a wider manifestation of public opinion, socialized into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking. He 
contended, “as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and 
behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that 
places them on the level of ‘cultural’ rather than mere policy.”[12]  
Snyder applied his strategic cultural framework to interpret the development of Soviet and 
American nuclear doctrines as products of different organizational, historical, and political 
contexts and technological constraints. The result was his prediction that the Soviet military 
exhibited a preference for the preemptive, offensive use of force and the origins for this could be 
found rooted in a Russian history of insecurity and authoritarian control. Ultimately, Snyder 
argued that strategic culture was “semi-permanent,” and new developments would be perceived 
only through the lens of strategic culture.  
Snyder’s contributions had resonance for other security policy analysts, and subsequent work on 
strategic culture, such as Booth’s Strategy and Ethnocentrism (1979), continued to explore the 
ideational foundations of nuclear strategy and superpower relations. Gray (1981) also suggested 
that distinctive national styles, with “deep roots within a particular stream of historical experience,” 
characterize strategy-making in countries like the United States and the Soviet Union. He defined 
strategic culture as “referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives 
from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in 
national terms” and even from “the civic culture and way of life.” Thus, strategic culture “provides 
the milieu within which strategy is debated” and serves as an independent determinate of 
strategic policy patterns. Like Snyder, Gray maintained that strategic culture would be a semi-
permanent influence on security policy.[13] 
While these arguments drew attention to the role of domestic conditions in shaping national 
security policy behavior, critics asserted that the operationalization of strategic culture, too, was 
problematic and subjective. They suggested that strategic cultural models were tautological, as it 
would be nearly impossible to separate independent and dependent variables in a reliable way. 
Critics also charged that strategic cultural interpretations were by definition unique, drawing upon 
narrow and contextual historiography as much as anthropology. Furthermore, both supporters 
and detractors believed that the concept of strategic culture was fairly static, focusing on enduring 
historical orientations with strong predictive capability. This left little room for development of a 
cross-national study of the phenomenon.  
Even supporters of strategic culture called for more careful study. Writing in 1988, Gray said that 
“social science has developed no exact methodology for identifying distinctive national cultures 
and styles.” Literature on the “academically unfashionable subject of national character” was 
anecdotal at best, yet he believed that learning about the “cultural thoughtways” of a nation was 
crucial to understanding a country’s behavior and its role in world politics.[14] Booth had called 
the formation of military strategy “a peculiarly ethnocentric business,” and Klein argued that only a 
“comparative, in-depth study of the formation, influence, and process of change in the strategic 
cultures of the major powers in the modern era” could make a useful contribution to studies of war 
and peace.[15] With the abrupt end of the Cold War, strategic culture once again fell into disfavor. 
Strategic Culture Rediscovered: The Rise of Constructivism  
In the 1990s, a third generation of scholarly work reasserted the utility of cultural 
interpretations.[16] Theoretical work on strategic culture, domestic structures, and organizational 
culture advanced significantly in this period, influenced, in part, by the rise of constructivism. 
Wendt argued that state identities and interests can be seen as “socially constructed by 
knowledgeable practice.”[17] Constructivism recognizes the importance of “inter-subjective 
structures that give the material world meaning,” including norms, culture, identity, and ideas on 
state behavior or on international relations more generally.[18] Given its proclaimed ontological 
agnosticism, Hopf argued that the paradigm provides “a promising approach for uncovering those 
features of domestic society, culture, and politics that should matter to state identity and state 
action in global politics.”[19] 
The constructivist research program devotes particular attention to identity formation, with 
connections to organizational process, history, tradition, and culture. According to Hudson, 
constructivism “views culture as an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, 
communications, and actions... Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term. At the 
moment of action, culture provides the elements of grammar that define the situation, that reveal 
motives, and that set forth a strategy for success.”[20] But constructivists focus primarily on social 
structures at the systems level, with special attention to the role of norms in international 
security.[21] Norms are defined as “intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that 
define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action.”[22] Tannenwald’s studies of the 
nuclear taboo and the norm of non-proliferation, along with Legro’s work on military restraint 
during World War II, are impressive forays into this subject, and they have generated a great deal 
of scholarly attention.[23] 
Although the central tenets of constructivism were familiar to many—Geertz’s work clearly had a 
significant influence on contemporary thinking, for example—Wendt and his supporters 
successfully framed it as a paradigmatic challenge to neorealism. One of the most controversial 
prongs of this challenge was the assertion by some constructivists that their approach would, 
assuredly, supplant neorealism as the dominant paradigm in the discipline. While this has not 
been accomplished, it is true that the rise of constructivism clearly energized a new wave of 
strategic cultural research. Farrell sees contemporary work as a merger of two relevant lines of 
scholarship—culturalism, as derived from comparative politics (and sociological and 
anthropological studies) and constructivism, from international relations theorists. Both, he 
contends, have recognized the impact of norms and ideas on international security. The merger 
of culturalism and constructivism allows us to “view actors and structure much differently than the 
rationalist approaches to international relations…locating actors in a social structure that both 
constitutes those actors and is constituted by their interactions.[24] But he does allow that 
differences in focus remain, with culturalists attending to social structures defined by domestic 
actors and conditions, and constructivists focusing on the social structure of state action in the 
international system. 
Third Generation Studies  
Johnston’s Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (1995) is 
often cited as the quintessential third generation work on strategic culture. The study set out to 
investigate the existence and character of Chinese strategic culture and causal linkages to the 
use of military force against external threats. Johnston takes the concept of strategic culture 
seriously as an “ideational milieu that limits behavioral choices,” from which “one could derive 
specific predictions about strategic choice.” But Johnston chose several unconventional research 
approaches.  
He selected the intriguing period of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) as the focus for his 
contemporary theoretical test. He said that strategic cultural arguments assert that “China has 
exhibited a tendency for the controlled, politically driven defensive and minimalist use of force that 
is deeply rooted in the statecraft of ancient strategists and a worldview of relatively complacent 
superiority.”[25] Based on careful historical analysis, Johnston concluded that there were two 
Chinese strategic cultures in action: “one a symbolic or idealized set of assumptions and ranked 
preferences, and one an operational set that had a nontrivial effect on strategic choices in the 
Ming period.”[26] Ironically, he found that while China does have characteristics of unique 
strategic cultures, these cultures actually exhibit some classic elements of realpolitik.  
Specialized studies of German and Japanese strategic culture also emerged in this period.[27] 
Berger’s Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (1998) focused on 
“antimilitarist political-military cultures” to explain patterns in these countries’ foreign policy 
behaviors.[28] Berger noted that while Japan’s economic and technological power placed it in a 
position to become an economic and perhaps even military superpower at the end of the Cold 
War, the persistent postwar culture of antimilitarism truly defined Japanese security policy in the 
1990s. According to Berger, cultural beliefs and values act as a distinct national lens to shape 
perceptions of events and even channel possible societal responses. In this sense, he states, 
“cultures enjoy a certain degree of autonomy and are not merely subjective reflections of concrete 
‘objective’ reality.”[29] To Berger, antimilitarist sentiments became deeply institutionalized in 
Germany and Japan through a long historical process that included legitimated compromises.  
Related works on German foreign policy in the 1990s interpret it as a product of both historical 
memory and geopolitical circumstances. Banchoff developed a consciously constructivist, “path-
dependent” model of foreign policy whereby he argues that decisions taken at critical historical 
junctures have shaped the development of foreign policy over time. These foreign policy paths 
form traditions and routines which are then adopted by political institutions. “Together,” he 
concludes, “interlocking institutions and political consensus sustained German foreign policy 
continuity across the 1990s divide.”[30] Meanwhile, Duffield contended that political culture has 
significantly influenced contemporary German foreign policy within a broader international 
environmental context.[31] He states that far from setting off in adventurous new directions, 
“Germany has exercised considerable restraint and circumspection in its external relations since 
1990… In short, notwithstanding initial fears to the contrary, Germany has acted with little more 
assertiveness and independent-mindedness in the area of national security than it did during the 
Cold War.”[32] To Duffield, “[t]he overall effect of national security culture is to predispose 
societies in general and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies over others. 
Some options will simply not be imagined…some are more likely to be rejected as inappropriate 
or ineffective than others.”[33] 
Another important strand of this scholarship focuses on military organizational cultures. For 
example, Kier described the significance of organizational culture in the development of French 
military doctrine.[34] Rosen provided a compelling account of the ways that the military and 
organizational cultures in India have shaped strategy over time. And in a rich work, Ebel, Taras, 
and Cochrane argued that the cultures of Latin American countries are distinctive, identifiable, 
and highly influential in the development of domestic and foreign policies.[35] According to these 
studies, organizational culture can be interpreted as an independent or intervening variable that 
directly influences strategic choice.  
A Research Agenda for Strategic Culture  
Generations of scholarship have produced greater understanding of ties between culture and 
state behavior. Strategic cultural studies have provided rich descriptions of particularistic cultures 
and identities, and researchers have acknowledged important links between external and internal 
determinants of national security policy. Cultural studies have been informed by cross-disciplinary 
linkages to anthropology, historical research, sociology, and psychology. Inspired by 
constructivism, scholars have begun to explore ways in which strategic culture is shaped and 
may evolve over time. As a result, even skeptics have acknowledged that contemporary works on 
culture offer much more than an "explanation of last resort." 
But this survey of the literature also points to substantial room for refinement of the research 
program. Areas for further attention include the development of a common definition of strategic 
culture to build theoretically progressive models, delineation of the ways that strategic culture is 
created, maintained, and passed on to new generations, the question of the universality of 
strategic culture, and refinement of models of linkages between external and internal 
determinants of security policy. While some scholars suggest that adoption of cultural models 
represents a fundamental rejection of structure, contemporary research suggests more 
comprehensive models of state behavior can be developed short of falsification of the realist 
program.[36] Contrary to neorealist critiques of ideational frameworks, few cultural scholars 
believe that this really is an “either-or” theoretical debate. Furthermore, many cultural scholars 
recognize the need for a defined ontology as well as falsifiable, middle-range theory. In this spirit, 
I offer a “to-do” list for the development of new, progressive models of strategic culture in 
comparative perspective.  
Develop Common Definitions 
Given decades of scholarship on cultural determinants, one might assume that strategic culture 
has become an accepted independent  variable in causal modeling. It has not. Snyder’s definition 
of strategic culture as “a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns 
socialized into a distinctive mode of thought” set the tone for decades of investigations.[37] Today, 
scholars seem to agree that distinct political cultures may exist, but definitions still blur the line 
between preference formation, values, and state behaviors. Pye’s definition of culture as “the 
dynamic vessel that holds and revitalizes the collective memories of a people by giving emotional 
life to traditions” is a case in point.[38] Here, strategic culture becomes a generator of preferences, 
a vehicle for the perpetuation of values and preferences, and a force of action in revitalization and 
renewal of these values. Rosen said that strategic culture includes the “beliefs and assumptions 
that frame...choices about international military behavior, particularly those concerning decisions 
to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of 
wartime casualties that would be acceptable.”[39] While more focused on preference structures, 
this definition includes reference to the rules that might govern conduct in war. Delineating culture 
as an independent variable remains challenging, and some scholarly efforts have bordered on 
tautology wherein domestic political structures are identified as both reflecting and shaping 
political culture.[40] 
Constructivism has energized work on strategic culture, but it has not advanced the search for a 
common definition. Hudson’s contention that culture is “an evolving system of shared meaning 
that governs perceptions, communications, and actions...” offers little in the way of testable 
hypotheses.[41] And ontological agnosticism may not provide a sufficient base for theory-building 
in strategic cultural studies. Scholars must recognize the difficulty of drawing linkages between 
political structure and state behavior yet seek consensus on explanatory boundaries.[42] 
Johnston offered one of the most promising avenues for a progressive research program on 
strategic culture by characterizing culture as “an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices.” 
But in so doing, his efforts have drawn fire from both first generation culturalists and 
constructivists. Johnston frames strategic culture as “shared assumptions and decision rules that 
impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, 
organizational or political environment.” While he noted that strategic subcultures may exist, 
“there is a generally dominant culture whose holders are interested in preserving the status quo.” 
This approach to strategic culture as a set of shared assumptions and decision rules allows one 
to separate the strands of culture from dependent variable outcomes like strategic choice. 
Furthermore, Johnston’s conceptual approach to strategic culture was designed to be falsifiable, 
“or at least distinguishable from non-strategic culture variables...[that would] provide decision-
makers with a uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which we can derive predictions 
about behavior.”[ 43] This work is certainly informed by progress in political psychology as well as 
contemporary sociological studies of the complex connections between culture and state 
behavior.  
In sum, there is real potential in the latest generation of work on strategic culture, which has 
tended to be more focused in its conceptualization of independent variables such as strategic 
cultural principles and dependent variables in specific security policy decisions. Nevertheless, 
there remains a significant arena for clarification of the research program.  
Who are the Keepers of Strategic Culture?  
Identifying strategic culture as a set of shared assumptions and decision rules prompts the 
question of how they are maintained, and by whom? Most scholars prefer descriptions of political 
and strategic cultures as the “property of collectivities rather than simply of the individuals that 
constitute them.”[44] For example, Wilson proposed:  
“In the most general sense political cultures are socially constructed normative systems that are 
the product of both social (for example, rules that coordinate role relationships within the 
organizations) and psychological (for example, the preferences of individuals) influences but are 
not reducible to either...A political culture is not simply the sum of individual preferences, nor do 
preferences, especially those of any given individual, necessarily correspond with normative 
prescriptions.”[45] 
Acknowledging strategic culture as an “important ideational source of national predispositions, 
and thus of national security policy,” suggests deep, but vague, cultural foundations for state 
behavior. If political culture is truly manifested in cognitive, evaluative, and expressive dimensions, 
it is conceivable that actors who carry those values might be identified. In fact, various political 
leaders and institutions are engaged in historical interpretation and development of the foreign 
policy path. This, in turn, prompts coalition-and consensus-building efforts by specific political 
players. To Duffield, “institutional sources of national predispositions are likely to reside in the 
central governmental organs charged with the formulation and execution of policy.” They may 
shape policy by “organizational processes, routines, and standard operating procedures may 
constraint the types of information to which decision makers are exposed.”[46] Berger suggests 
that political culture can only be understood as a combination of norms and political institutions 
which “exist in an interdependent relationship.”[47] 
Elites are often the purveyors of the common historical narrative.[48] Most scholars agree that 
elites are instrumental in defining foreign policy goals and the scope and direction of policy 
restructuring in the face of new challenges. Furthermore, there is a general consensus in the 
literature that elites are cognitively predisposed to maintain the status quo. But Berger’s work on 
policy discourse recognizes the fact that strategic culture is best characterized as a “negotiated 
reality” among elites. Leaders clearly pay respect to deeply held convictions such as 
multilateralism and historical responsibility, but the record of past behavior for many countries 
also shows that leaders chose when and where to stake claims of strategic cultural traditions; 
they decided when and where to consciously move beyond previous boundaries of acceptability 
in foreign policy behavior. Ultimately, contemporary scholarship contends, elite behavior may be 
more consistent with the assertion that leaders are strategic “users of culture” who “redefine the 
limits of the possible” in key foreign and security policy discourses.[49] 
Political institutions—including parties and domestic coalitions—also have a significant impact on 
foreign policy behavior. The organizational culture literature, for example, suggests that state 
behavior is a function of specific institutional orientations. Studies of Japanese and German 
foreign policy decisions in the 1990s argue that there are enduring institutional manifestations of 
strategic culture. But the keepers of the culture may not be military bureaucracies. Indeed, in 
Germany the Foreign Minister has dominant control over foreign and security policy. In Japan, 
political institutions from the Diet to the Liberal Democratic Party to the Self-Defense Forces 
share commitments to a foreign policy of restraint.[50] Whether or not military bureaucracies are 
the most common keepers of strategic culture around the world, it remains the case that the 
influence of organizational culture on state behavior is mediated by other institutions and by the 
policy making process in democratic states.  
Continuity or Change? The Evolution of Strategic Culture  
The focus of most studies of strategic culture is on continuity of state behavior. Eckstein (1998) 
suggested that the socialization of values and beliefs occurs over time. Past learning becomes 
sedimented in the collective consciousness and is relatively resilient to change. Lessons of the 
past, therefore, serve as a tight filter for any future learning that might occur.[51] An intriguing 
characteristic of the latest generation of cultural studies, however, is the recognition of the 
possibility of change over time. If historical memory, political institutions, and multilateral 
commitments shape strategic culture, then, recent studies argue, it would seem logical to accept 
that foreign policies around the globe are undergoing “enduring transformations.”[52] This 
contribution to the strategic culture literature is informed both by studies of foreign policy 
restructuring and constructivist ideas on foreign policy as discourse. It also represents a response 
to the criticism of prior generations of cultural models as static and unresponsive to systemic 
pressures.[53] 
Under what conditions can strategic culture change? When might foreign policy decisions 
transcend the traditional bounds of strategic culture? In my own work on the subject, I contend 
that at least two conditions can cause “strategic cultural dilemmas” and produce changes in 
security policy. First, external shocks may fundamentally challenge existing beliefs and 
undermine past historical narratives. For German leaders in the 1990s, the scale of the 
humanitarian tragedies in the Balkans served as a catalyst for consideration of policy options 
outside the traditional bounds of German strategic culture. The recognition that groups were 
being systematically targeted for genocide and ethnic cleansing created a moral imperative for 
German action. Thus, the intensity of external shocks prompted a reexamination on all sides of 
the proper response. Neither economic power nor diplomacy was sufficient to prevent these 
tragedies, and even pacifists were forced to consider the use of military force as the final option to 
end the conflict. Some experts have even suggested that ethnic cleansing in Bosnia eroded the 
moral legitimacy of pacifism on the German political left and led to an atmosphere more 
permissive of the use of force to stop such violence.[54] 
But most scholars rightly assert that any process of change would not be easy. Potential catalysts 
for change, Berger argued, might be “dramatic events or traumatic experiences [such as 
revolutions, wars, and economic catastrophes],” that would “discredit thoroughly core beliefs and 
values.”[55] Such change would be accompanied by extreme psychological stress and would 
require a resocialization process, involving participation by various groups in the crafting of a 
compromise on a new political cultural orientation.[56] 
Second, foreign policy behavior may break the traditional bounds of strategic cultural orientations 
when primary tenets of strategic thought come into direct conflict with one another. In other words, 
a country with interpretive codes of support for democracy and an aversion to the use of military 
force faces a strategic cultural dilemma when confronted by a challenge to democracy that 
necessitates a military response. The Japanese government confronted this question in relation 
to the struggle for self-determination in East Timor. The same type of dilemma may arise from a 
conflict between commitments to multilateralism and unilateral convictions that norms are being 
violated. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky said that cultures remain vital only if their core principles 
continue to generate solutions that satisfy human needs and make sense of the world.[57] 
Products of this strategic cultural dissonance include occasional state defections from multilateral 
arrangements, the development of alternative diplomatic initiatives, or stipulations for policy 
cooperation.  
Thus, strategic cultural dilemmas define new directions for foreign policy and demand the 
reconstruction of historical narratives. Changes—including abrupt and fairly dramatic 
reorientations of security policy behavior—appear to be possible, and strategic cultural models 
must be more reflective of the conditions that draw out such changes. Indeed, Swidler recognized 
that the relationship between state behavior and strategic culture becomes especially apparent 
“in unsettled cultural periods…when explicit ideologies govern action [and] structural opportunities 
for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run.”[58] As NATO 
leaders implement a new strategic concept, China pursues liberalized trade, and the United 
States leads a global war on terrorism in the 21st century, strategic cultural models must 
themselves adapt for long-term relevance.  
Perhaps Berger is correct that strategic culture is best understood as a “negotiated reality” among 
foreign policy elites. While leaders clearly pay respect to deeply held convictions associated with 
strategic culture, the story of foreign policy development may be best understood as the pursuit of 
legitimation for preferred policy courses that may, or may not, conform to traditional cultural 
boundaries. In a recent study, Cruz contended that elites have much more latitude than scholars 
generally allow. They may “recast a particular agenda as most appropriate to a given collective 
reality or...recast reality itself by establishing a (new) credible balance between the known and 
the unknown.” In short, Cruz argued, they “redefine the limits of the possible, both descriptively 
and prescriptively.”[59] 
The Universality of Strategic Culture?  
The events of September 11th and the subsequent war on terrorism have prompted renewed 
attention to the role of culture in shaping state (and non-state) behaviors. But one of the most 
intriguing questions that carries over through several generations of scholarship is what types of 
actors are most likely to have defined strategic cultures. For example, Snyder made a strong 
case for the existence—and influence of—strategic culture in Soviet nuclear policy. Subsequent 
studies effectively framed U.S. and Soviet cultures within the larger Cold War context. But does 
the literature imply that authoritarian systems more likely to have defined strategic cultures than 
are democratic systems? Or, are authoritarian systems simply less likely to have definable 
strategic subcultures? Can non-state actors have strategic cultures? Can regional organizations 
or meta-cultural groups have some form of strategic culture?  
A fascinating debate has emerged over whether the European Union (EU) can establish a 
strategic culture. The EU formalized a common European Security Strategy (ESS) for the first 
time in its history in December 2003. Some hailed the achievement as marking a common 
European strategic culture, but others question whether the EU will ever be capable of forging a 
bond of common threat perceptions and interests. Optimists such as Cornish and Edwards (2001) 
contend that “there are signs that a European strategic culture is already developing through a 
socialization process.” They define EU strategic culture as simply “the institutional confidence and 
processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and 
effective policy instruments.”[60] To Meyer (2004), the European Council vote on ESS in 
December 2003 provided a necessary “strategic concept” around which to focus attention and 
resources.[61] However, Lindley-French (2002) charges that Europe lacks both the capabilities 
and will to establish a common foreign and security policy in the foreseeable future. He 
characterizes the Europe of today as “not so much an architecture as a decaying arcade of 
stately structures of varying designs reflective of a bygone era.”[62] Europeans disagree over 
threat perception and the proper responses to perceived threats, and they themselves question 
whether the EU can be an effective actor in the face of serious crises. Rynning (2003) concludes 
that the “EU is unlikely to develop a coherent and strong strategic culture” any time soon.[63] 
Finally, Huntington’s "civilizational thesis" pushes the envelope of theoretical interpretation.[64] 
He contended that states are part of broader civilizations that share strong bonds of culture, 
societal values, religion, and ideologies. The most important of these bonds, he argued, is religion, 
and “the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world’s great 
religions.”[65] Meta-cultural ties, taken to the broadest level of categorization, are civilizational 
identities that shape modern world politics. The crux of the civilizational thesis is Huntington’s 
argument that conflict is more likely to occur between states of different civilizations in the post-
Cold War era.[66] Ultimately, Huntington insisted, decision-makers would be “much more likely to 
see threats coming from states whose societies have different cultures and hence which they do 
not understand and feel they cannot trust.”[67] 
The civilizational thesis has drawn sharp criticism from the scholarly community. Area studies 
experts are critical of Huntington’s willingness to propose the sweeping generalizations that were 
necessary to undergird the civilizational thesis. Proponents of cultural interpretations take issue 
with Huntington’s reduction of civilizational identity to a focus on religion. They claim that this 
represents an over-simplification of more complex anthropological and social-psychological 
chords that define a cultural (or perhaps meta-cultural) group. Others have challenged 
Huntington’s work on the obvious limitations of empirical foundation. And recent investigations of 
Huntington’s claims (Henderson and Tucker 2001; Henderson 2000) have concluded that there is 
no statistically significant causal linkage before, during, or after the Cold War.[68] In the end, 
Huntington’s work may have undermined the careful, social scientific progress that had been 
achieved in the cultural research program.  
Conclusion 
While constructivism may represent a paradigmatic challenge to structural realism in the 
discipline today, most supporters of strategic culture have adopted the more modest goal of 
"bringing culture back in" to the study of national security policy. In fact, these research traditions 
are more similar than some would believe. Scholars must work to overcome barriers to 
integration of these two approaches into a more comprehensive model of strategic culture 
formation, implementation, and change. Some argue that one of these barriers is a certain 
defensiveness on the part of neorealists, who contend that culturalists (and constructivists) simply 
seek to supplant neorealism.  
But ultimately, even Desch allows that cultural theories might supplement neorealism by helping 
to explain time lags between structural change and alterations in state behavior, by accounting for 
seemingly "irrational" state behavior, and in helping to explain state actions in “structurally 
indeterminate situations.”[69] For example, the cases of the evolution of German and Japanese 
security policies are better understood as a product of domestic political adjustments (rooted in 
culture, traditions, and common historical narratives) to changing international circumstances. Far 
from an exclusive interpretation, progressive models that explore external-internal linkages and 
their impact on discrete, strategic choices represent an important avenue for theoretical 
advancement.  
Finally, constructivism has directed new attention to ideational variables and energized third 
generation studies. But one wonders exactly how far strategic cultural models can stretch while 
retaining any sort of legitimacy. For example, Basrur’s study of Indian strategic culture and 
nuclear weapons suggests some promise, but seems to waiver on defining key actors and 
continuity in nuclear policy.[70] Booth and Trood’s edited volume on strategic cultures in the Asia-
Pacific region, offers additional perspective. But by grounding their study in postpositivism, they 
deftly avoid the advancement of middle-range theory. Instead, they readily admit that their 
culturalist study is “less concerned with the immediacy and neatness of causal connections.”[71] 
As Checkel contends, constructivists have “succeeded in broadening the theoretical contours of 
international relations” by enabling research on international norms and ideas. But, he contends 
that a remaining ontological challenge is the need to “avoid the charge that they are reducing one 
unit of analysis—agents—to the other, structures (norms).”[72] Constructivists need to be very 
careful about the emergent “empirical ad hocism” with the invocation of “all sorts of competing 
implicit models of domestic politics.”[73] 
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